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Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) considered the failure of the highest Italian court to
provide a statement of reasons for its refusal to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) to constitute a violation of article 6 ECHR in Dhahbi and Schipani. These judgments have
been criticised for changing the nature of the preliminary reference procedure from a mechanism of
inter-judicial co-operation to a mechanism safeguarding the individual right o a fair trial. This article
argues that hese fears are somewhat exaggerated since the EC J and national courts have also scrutinised
the preliminary reference procedure under an individual fundamental rights-based approach. What is
more problematic, however, is the inconsistent approach oftheECtHR. The EC J should therefore provide
guidance to national courts what heir obligations are if they refuse to refer. This all the more given that
the preliminary reference procedure shows significant shortcomings from the point of view of effective
judicial protection.
Introduction
The European Court of Justice (EC J) has consistently held that he Treaties establish a "complete system
of legal remedies and procedures".' The "keystone" of this system is the preliminary mling procedure as
the ECJ held in Opinion 2/13 ^  The preliminary reference procedure is laid down in art.267 TFEU and it
provides for national courts to submit questions to the ECJ about the interpretation and validity of EU
law.3 National courts are indispensable "linchpins" of this system of EU judicial protection and they are
'Assistant professor of European law. This article forms part of the research project "It takes two to tango The
preliminary eference dance between the Court of Justice of the European Union and national courts", fandedby a
VENI grant by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). I would like to thank Malu Beijer, Thorn
Dieben, Melissa Hengevelt and Henri de Waele as well as the anonymous peer eviewer and the editor for their
valuable comments on earlier versions.
lLes Verts v Parliament (C-294/83) EU:C:1986:166; [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 343 at [23].
2 Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (2/13) EU:C:2014:2454; [2015] 2 C.M.L.R. 2_latJ176].Seeearlier
Opinion ofAG Tizzano in Criminal Proceedings against Lyckeskog (C-99/00) EU:C:2002:329;J2004] 3 C.M.L.R.
29 at [69]. Craig referred to the "jewel in the crown" of the CJEU. P. Craig, "The Jurisdiction of the Community
Courts Reconsidered" in G. de Burca and J. Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), p.559.
3 Such ordinary or lower courts, nonetheless, have an obligation to refer when the validity ofEU law is in question.
Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost (C-3 14/85) EU:C: 1987:452; [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 57 at[14]-[15].
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essential in ensuring the protection of individual's rights." Their power to make a reference "constitutes
the very essence of the [Union] system of judicial protection".5 Courts of last instance ven have an
obligation to refer, but the ECJ has listed several exceptions in CILFIT. A reference is not required if a
question on EU law is not relevant for the outcome of the dispute, if the point ofEU law has already been
dealt with by the ECJ (acte eclairs doctrine) or if the correct application ofEU law "may be so obvious
as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt" (acte clair).6
For quite some time individuals have complained about arbitrary refusals of national courts to refer
questions to the ECJ. Since individuals cannot ake the matter directly to the ECJ, they have turned to
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for relief. In 2014 and 2015, the ECtHR found a violation
of art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on two occasions where a national court
failed to provide a statement of reasons as to why it refused to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.8
These judgments eem to change the nature of the preliminary reference procedure from a mechanism of
inter-judicial co-operation to a mechanism safeguarding the individual right o a fair trial. This "interference"
of the ECtHR raises intriguing questions, especially from the point of view of the "specific haracteristics
and the autonomy ofEU law" that he EC J was so keen to defend in Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the
ECHR. Therefore, it does not seem surprising that ECtHR case law has already raised some eyebrows at
the ECJ in Luxembourg. It was actually one of the two specific topics discussed during the first official
meeting between the judges of the ECJ and ECtHR since Opinion 2/13 in March 2016.10
The main question that his article intends to answer is whether these concerns about he interference
ofECtHR are justified and whether there is reason as well as a (solid) legal basis for the ECJ to provide
guidance as well on the matter of obliging national courts to give reasons for refusals to refer. This article,
after discussing the case law of the ECtHR on the preliminary reference procedure, critically assesses this
case law from the perspective of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The article then
analyses whether the ECJ should also explain which obligations national courts have when they refuse to
refer a question in the light of the available remedies in relation to national court's refusals to refer. The
last section examines whether a basis can be found in EU law for requiring national courts to substantiate
their efusals to refer.
K. Lenaerts et al., EU Procedural Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.3. See also Rewe v
Landwirtschaftskammerjurdas Saarland (33/76) EU:C:1976:188; [1977] 1 C.M.L.R, 533 at [5]; Comet BVv
PmduktschapvoorSiergewassen(45H6)'EV:C:l976:l9lsit[l2];KoblervAustria(C-224/Ol)m}:C:2003:5l3;[2Q03]
3 C.M.L.R. 28 at [35]; Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454; [2015] 2 C.M.L.R. 21 at [175]. .
5Area Cova v Council (C-300/99 P) EU:C:2001:71 a.t[54];Area v Council and Commission (C-301/99)
EU:C:2001:72at[46].
^CILFITv Ministero delta Sanita (283/81) EU:C:1982:335; [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472 at [10]-[16].
7 E.g. the complaint of a Dutch law firm to the European Commission about he almost consistent refusal of the
Amsterdam District Court to refer cases to the CJEU in European Arrest Warrant cases, available at http://www.jahae
. nl/wp-contenl/uploads/2015/08/}50730-Brief-EC-EAB-vragen-HvJ-EU-ex.-bylagen.pcy[Accessed 15 December
2016]. See also Petition 0487/2012 by F.D., on parties in legal proceedings being unable to force national supreme
courts to raise preliminary questions before the Court of Justice of the European Union, 31 January 2014,
PE528.213v01.00.
[Dhahbiv Italy (17120/09) 8April 2014; Schipani v Italy (38369/09) 21 July 2015.
In Opinion 2/13, the CJEU declared the agreement on the accession of the EU to the ECHR to be incompatible
with art.6(2) TEU. C. Lacchi, "The ECrtHR's Interference in the Dialogue between National Courts and the Court
of Justice of the EU: Implications for the Preliminary Reference Procedure" (2015) 8 Review of European Administrative
Law 95; Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454; [2015] 2 C.M.L.R. 21 at [258].
In addition to "the preliminary uling procedure and the European Convention of Human Rights", the Dublin
System was discussed as well as, more generally, the recent case law of both couns. See "A delegation from the
European Court of Human Rights visits the Court of Justice of the European Union", Press Release No.25/16 (7
March 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-03/cpl60025en.pdf [Accessed. 15
December 2016].
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The ECtHR perspective
The ECtHR has held, albeit not always very consistently, that an individual does not have a right under
the ECHR to have a national court send a preliminary reference to the EC J. The ECtHR has never
reviewed the correctness of the way in which a national court has dealt with its obligation to refer-and
cannot do so either-since this would mean that it expresses an opinion on the interpretation and application
ofEU law.12 This also means that he ECtHR is not in a position to examine whether a national court was
justified in not seeking a preliminary mling. What he ECtHR has done, however, is to examine whether
the reasoning on the part of national courts which refuse to send a preliminary reference to the EC J, was
in conformity with art.6 ECHR. The ECtHR has developed quite a large body of case law on the requirement
for national courts to state reasons when refusing to send a preliminary reference to the EC J. There are
two main reasons why the ECtHR requires judgments to be sufficiently reasoned in the light of art.6
ECHR. First, it ensures that the right o be heard is respected in the sense that he court sufficiently
addresses the parties' submissions.14 Secondly, the obligation to state reasons makes it clear for the party
against who judgment is given why its arguments were unsuccessful and it enables that party to assess
whether an appeal would be likely to succeed or not.
The ECtHR's jurispmdence has evolved over time and become stricter. Initially, the ECtHR applied
the criterion of arbitrariness and held that a refusal of a request for such a referral might infringe the
fairness of proceedings if it appeared to be arbitrary.17 The ECtHR, however, did not really specify what
was required from national courts in tenns of the required level of stating reasons. It merely held that he
obligation to state reasons may vary according to the nature of the decision and in the light of the
circumstances of each case.18 Nor does art.6 ECHR require a detailed answer to every argument put forward
by the parties." The ECtHR seemed to accept hat, in order to prevent a finding of arbitrariness, national
" As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the cases that end before the ECtHR are simply not admitted, and the
reasons provided by the ECtHR are a standardised two or three liner: "The Coun reiterates that he Convention does
not guarantee, as such, any right o have a case referred ...". See e.g. Wallishauserv Austria (No.2) (14491/06)20
June 2013 at [84]; Rutar Marketing v Slovenia (62020/11) 15 April 2014 at [20]. See also Societe DIVAGSA v Spam
(20631/92) 12 May 1993; Coeme v Belgium (32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96) 22 June 2000
at [114]; Ullens de'Schooten and Rezabekv Belgium (3989/07 and 38353/07) 20 September 2011 at [57] See however,
Bosphoms Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (45036/9S) 30 June 2005 at [164]: "The parties
to the domestic proceedings have the right o put their case to the CJEU during the art. 177 process.'
"In Ullens de Schooten^be ECtHR considered that it did not have jurisdiction to examine the "detailed arguments'
put forward by the applicants as to the erroneous interpretation f EU law by Belgian courts. Ullensde Schooten v
'Belgium (3989/07 and 38353/07) at [66]; Bosphorus v Ireland (45036/98) at [143]^£)AaAA; v Italy (17120/09) at [3 1].
From theperspective of the CJEU, see Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454; [2015] 2 C.M.L.R. 21 at [246].
13 This case law has its origins in cases dealing with preliminary questions in the national context sent by lower
courts to the highest administrative court: e.g. Coemev Belgium (32492/96) (32492/96, 32547/96,32548/96,33209/96
and 33210/96).
WJokelav Finland (2W56/95) 21 May 2002 at [72]-[73]; Nedzela v France (73695/01) 27 July 2006 at [55]. See
also Opinion of AG Kokott in Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd (C-619/10) EU.C:2012:53 1 at[84]
15 Hirvisaari v Finland (496S4/99) 27 September 2001 at [30]; Trade Agency (C-619/10) EU:C:2012:531 at [53];_
flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines AS vStarptautiskalidosta Riga K45(C-302/13)EU:C:2014:2319; [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 27
at [51].
See also concurring opinion of Judge Wojtyczek in Schipani v Italy (38369/09) at [5].
17 Judgment of the ECtHR in Societe Divagasa; Dotta v Italy (38399/97) 7 January 1 999;PredilAnstalt SA v Italy
(31993/96) 8 June 1999; Bakker v Austria (43454/98) 10 April 2003; Matheis v Germany (73711/01) 1 February
2005.
18 Van de Hurk v Netherlands (16034/90) 19 April 1994 at [61]; Balani v Spain (18064/91) 9December 1994 at
[27]; Ruiz v Spain (30544/96) 21 January 1999 at [29].
19 Van de Hwk at (16034/90) at [61]; Ruiz v Spain (30544/96) at [26].
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coiirts should refer to one of the CILFIT exceptions20 or state that the applicant's request does not deal
with a question ofEU law.2'
In Ullens de Schooten, the ECtHR went one step further and determined that art.6(l) ECHR imposes
an obligation on domestic ourts of last instance to state reasons for any decision in which they refuse to
refer a preliminary question. The ECtHR held:
"National courts against whose decisions there is no remedy under national law, which refuse to refer
to the Court of Justice a preliminary question on the interpretation of Community law that has been
raised before them, are obliged to give reasons for their efusal in the light of the exceptions provided
for in the case-law of the Court of Justice. They will be required, in accordance with the
above-mentioned CILFIT case law, to indicate the reasons why they have found that he question is
irrelevant, that the European Union law provision in question has already been interpreted by the
Court of Justice, or that he correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope
for any reasonable doubt."
In this case, the ECtHR did not find a violation ofart.6(l) ECHR, since the Belgian court had, first,
provided "comprehensive reasons" to show why the question had already been settled by the ECJ, in the
light of the case law of the ECJ. 23 Secondly, the Belgian court had offered "demonstrative r asoning"
supporting the finding that here was no reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question must be
resolved and that an interpretation of the ECJ would not affect he outcome of the dispute.24
The ECtHR for the first time found a violation ofart.6(l) ECHR in relation to a refusal of a (highest)
national court o submit a preliminary reference to the EC J in the two cases ofDhahbi and Schipani. The
ECtHR held va. Dhahbi that he judgment of the Italian Cassation Court failed to mention the applicant's
request for a preliminary ruling as to whether a Tunisian worker could be refused the family allowance
under the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement. The Cassation Court examined the request for a referral
implicitly by looking at the merits of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, including the provision referred
to by the applicant. It concluded that he Agreement only applied to social security benefits in the context
of employments relations and that he social assistance allowances the applicant was hinting at fell outside
the scope of the Agreement.25 The ECtHR considered this implicit reasoning by the Italian Court insuf&cient.
The ECtHR thus determined that,
"it is therefore not clear from the reasoning of the impugned judgment whether that question was
considered not to be relevant or to relate to a provision which was clear or had already been interpreted
by the ECJ, or whether it was simply ignored .... The Court observed in this connection that the
reasoning of the Court of Cassation contained no reference to the case-law of the ECJ. "26
Schipani was the second time that he ECtHR found a violation ofart.6(l) ECHR. The ECtHR based
itself primarily on the absence of any explicit reference to the second part of the requested preliminary
questions.27 The ECtHR did not examine, however, whether it concurred with the implicit statement in
WDottav Italy (38399/97) at [13]; Moosbrugger v Austria (44861/98) 25 January 2000 at [2].
"Matheis v Germany (73711/01) at [3]; Bakker v Austria (43454/98); Desmots v France (41358/98) 2 July 2002
at[2],,
22 Ullens de Schooten v Belgium (3989/07 and 38353/07) at [57] and [59]-[60].
23 Ullens de Schooten (3989/07 and 38353/07) at [64].
24 Ullens de Schooten (3989/07 and 38353/07) at [65].
25 Ullens de Schooten (3989/07 and 38353/07) at [13]-[15].
26 Dhahbiv Italy (17120/09) at [33].
"Schipaniv Italy (38369/09) at [23].
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which the referring national court seemed to suggest hat he first question does not need to be referred
to the ECJ, given the case law of the ECJ.
Dhahbimd Schipani can be contrasted with three other cases in which the ECtHR seemingly adopted
a more lenient approach. In Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica, the ECtHR considered the "summary
reasoning" on the part of the Dutch Supreme Court adequate. The Supreme Court did not consider it
necessary to refer the question as to whether EU law allows for an interpretation that the UN enjoys
absolute'immunity within Member States, since the Court simply held that he UN has such immunity.
The Supreme Court determined that his decision ot to refer did not warrant further explanation because
of a provision in the Judiciary (Organisation) Act.29 The Supreme Court, however, did not explicitly refer
to one of the C7ZF/T grounds or other judgments of the ECJ that would (implicitly) support he fmding
that a preliminary reference was not required.30 The ECtHR, however, did not really apply the principles
ofDhahbi since it accepted rather easily that here was no need to seek a preliminary mling from the ECJ
In the subsequent Dutch case of Chylinski, the ECtHR even applied-without much discussion-its Dhahbi
criteria to a lower court against whose decisions there was a judicial remedy.31 The ECtHR considered the
rather minimal reasoning" on the part of the Dutch courts sufficient as well. The courts explicitly stated
that a preliminary reference was not necessary, without even referring to the (CILFIT) case law of the
ECJ. 32 In Wind Telecomunicazione, the ECtHR was also more deferent since it accepted the Italian Cassation
Court's implicit reasoning that a reference "clearly" would not contribute to the outcome of the case, even
though the Court failed to make an explicit reference to the parties' request for a referral/
This short overview of cases illustrates that it is not easy to generate any general conclusions, all the
more so because the ECtHR has held that he obligation to state reasons may vary according to the nature
of the decision and in the light of the circumstances of each case.34 The difficulty of distilling some general
principles is also caused by the casuistic nature of the judgments of the ECtHR Moreover, the ECtHR
itself is not very transparent about which elements it considers decisive in (not) finding a violation.
Four general observations, however, can be distilled from the analysis of the case law. First, one element
that he ECtHR takes into account is the responsibility of the applicant to substantiate a request for a
preliminary mling with relevant arguments that show the necessity for such a request. A failure to do so
could preclude the ECtHR from finding a violation ofart.6(l) ECHR. 35 In some earlier cases, the ECtHR
"The Cassation Court made clear in its judgment that it followed the Court of Appeal's interpretation f the relevant
EU legislation. Both courts discussed the'matter in the light of the case law of the CJEU and seemed to implicitly
show That here was no need to refer the matter to the CJEU since there was no reasonable doubt as to the correct
application of EU law. They held that he non-implementation f a directive amounted to a grave and manifest
FnfringementofEU law giving rise to state liability'and supported this finding with references to Carbonari vUniversita
deglFstudi di Bologna (C-131/97) EU:C:1999:98 and Gozza v Umversita degli Studidi Padova (C-371/97)
EU;C:2000:526; [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 20. Both courts, however, did not mention that he applicants had requested a
referral nor did they refer to CILFIT. Schipmi v Italy (38369/09) at [22], [25], [27] and [71].
"Article 81 of this Act stipulates that when the Supreme Court considers that a ground of complaint cannot result
in cassation and does not warrant the answering of questions of law in the interest of the uniform application or
development of the law, it may confine itself to stating this consideration.
3a Stickling Mothers ofSrebrenica v Netherlands (65542/12) at [173].
31 This was only the case in the application ofMilkovics where the Amsterdam District Court considered this case
in the first instance and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the second instance. Chylinski v Netherlands (38044/12)
at [17] and [20].
11 Chylinski v Netherlands (38044/12) [2015] at [9], [17], [21] and [30].
"This was because the Cassation Court could only accept appeals to the decisions of the Council of State when
the latter infringed the "outer limits" of the Council's jurisdiction following art. 111(8) of the Italian^Constitution. The
Court could thus not examine the fulfilment of the conditions ofart.267 TFEU and CILFIT. Wind Telecomunicazione
v Italy (5159/14) at [20]-[21] and [35]-[36].
34 Lacchi. "The ECrtHR's Interference" (2015)8 Review of European Administrative Law 95 1 UU.
35 Moosbrugger v Austria (44861/98) at [2]; judgment of the ECtHR m John v Germany.
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was rather strict and required the request to be "specific, pertinent and important".36 In Schipani and
especially Dhahbi, the ECtHR did not pay (much) attention, however, to the request's degree of detail of
the requests. It is therefore still not very clear what he ECtHR expects exactly from the parties' requests.
One related problem is that he ECtHR does not, or not always, reproduce those requests in its judgments,
which makes it difficult to take stock of the elaborateness of the parties' requests for a referral. Based on
the ECtHR judgments alone, the difference between Schipani and ChylinskilStichting Mothers ofSrebrenica
could possibility be attributed to the difference in the level of details in the request, because the arguments
of the applicants in Schipani were seemingly more extensive.37
Secondly, the ECtHR seems to consider such an explicit reference to the applicant's request for a
preliminary ruling more important han a substantive engagement with EU law. This rather strict and
formalistic approach of the ECtHR is not surprising, because it is not for the ECtHR to examine any
mistake that may have been made by the national courts in interpreting or applying EU law.38 The ECtHR
generally limits itself to a procedural review and does not determine whether a national court was indeed
justified in not seeking a preliminary mling or whether the CILFIT exceptions were indeed not fulfilled.
In some cases, the ECtHR, however, examines how the national court handled the request for a preliminary
ruling from a more substantive point of view.
Thirdly, the ECtHR requires national courts to refer to the case law of the ECJ in their refusal. It is not
really clear, however, which case law the ECtHR has in mind: the C/Z/-777 judgment or the ECJ case law
which supports the view that here is no reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation ofEU law.
Fourthly, the ECtHR is stricter with respect to courts or tribunals of a Member State against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy. In doing so, the ECtHR follows the design ofart.267 TFEU, which
only obliges the highest courts to refer questions to the ECJ. However, the case law of the ECtHR is not
entirely clear yet, since the ECtHR has not mled out the possibility that lower courts could infringe art. 6
ECHR when refusing to refer in Ullens de Schooten and indeed seemed to apply the Dhahbi reasoning to
such lower courts in Chylinski.w
In sum, the ECtHR has slowly been developing case law on the guarantees that must be provided on
the basis of the right o a fair trial in relation to the EU's preliminary reference procedure. However, the
case law of the ECtHR has not yet fully matured. It is still being discussed within the ECtHR what he
exact scope is of the obligation to state reasons. Judge Wojtyczek, for example, argued for a more deferent
approach of the ECtHR in his concurring opinion in Schipani, since he considered the determination of a
violation in the absence of any reasons for the refusal problematic.4'
The EU and ECJ perspective
The EC J has to date not mled upon the obligations for national courts in terms of providing reasons when
they decline to refer to the EC J. It has, however, frequently pronounced itself upon national courts'
^Pronina v Uh-aine (63566/00) 18 July 2006 at [25]; Wallishauser v Austria (No.2) (14497/06) at [85].
Schipani v Italy (38369/09) at [19]-[24]. Nonetheless, the request in the pleas submitted before the Amsterdam
District Court and Amsterdam Court of Appeal in Chylinski were, however, rather specific. Pleas received by Thorn
Dieben via email.
38 The ECtHR, however, stated that its "verification has to be made thoroughly" or "rigoureusement". Dhahbi v
Italy (17120/09) at [31]; Schipani v Italy (38369/09) at [69].
InBosphorus the ECtHR examined whether the C/ZF/7'exceptions were fulfilled, while in Wind Telecomunicazione
it examined whether a reference was necessary to solve the dispute. Bosphorus v Ireland (45036/98) at [147].
""See fn.31. The ECtHR did not rule out he possibility that art.6 ECHR might be infringed for a refusal to refer
"even if that court is not ruling in the last instance". Ullens de Schooten (3989/07 and 38353/07) at [59]; M. Broberg,
"National CouUs of Last Instance failing to make a Preliminary Reference: the (Possible) Consequences flowing
Therefrom" (2016) 22 European Public Law 243, 249.
41 Wojtyczek, Schipani v Italy (38369/09) at [7].
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decisions to refer when examining the admissibility of questions. The ECJ expects national courts to
specify why a preliminary reference is necessary.42 It is, however, more difficult for the ECJ to pronomice
itself on a national court's decision ot to refer, since most of these cases simply do not reach the ECJ.'
It is not completely clear, therefore, whether the ECJ also expects national courts to specify why a
preliminary reference is no? necessary. Nor is it clear what he ECJ "thinks" of the approach of the ECtHR.
There is, however, currently a case pending on the matter. "4 This case provides a good occasion for the
court to express itself on these matters.
This section provides a thorough reflection on the case law of the ECtHR from the perspective of the
ECJ and points to several difficulties that may arise in connection with the approach oftheECtHR. It
subsequently provides an argument why the ECJ should also step in and conclude that national courts are
indeed obliged to provide reasons for their refusals to refer in the light of the absence of any effective
remedies for individuals to obtain relief or a national court's refusal to refer. The article ends with an
analysis whether there is also a solid legal basis in EU law for requiring national courts to do so.
The case law of the ECtHRfrom the perspective of the CJEU
The case law of the ECtHR raises interesting questions about he relationship between the ECtHR and
the EU. As mentioned before, the case law of the ECtHR was actually one of the two specific topics
discussed during the first official meeting of the judges of the ECJ and those of the ECtHR since Opinion
2/13 in March 2016.45 Before touching upon the problematic aspects of the case law of the ECtHR from
the perspective ofEU law, it should be emphasised that he ECtHR's scrutiny could in principle strengthen
national courts' compliance with art.267 TFEU and thus contribute positively to the effectiveness ofEU
law.46
What has been described as particularly problematic from an EU law perspective is that the
Dhahbi/Schipani case law of the ECtHR could have repercussions on the functioning of the preliminary
reference procedure as it has been conceived and developed by the ECJ. 47 While the ECJ construes the
procedure as a mechanism of inter-judicial co-operation, the ECtHR treats the procedure more as an
element of the individual right o a fair trial. The ECJ famously mled in CILFITthat art.267 TFEU "does
not constitute a means of redress available to the parties to a case".48Article 267 is entirely a court-to-court
procedure, which is "completely independent of any initiative by the parties".49 The ECJ has primarily
stressed the importance of ensuring the uniform interpretation and application ofEU law and the effective
42[2012]OJC338/01,para.22. _
43 One exception is Ferreira da Silva. This case reached the CJEU via a reference for a preliminary ruling from a
lower Portuguese court in an action for non-contractual civil iability against he Portuguese State for the failure to
refer of a national court adjudicating at last instance. Ferreira da Silva e Brito v Portugal (C-160/14) EU:C:2015:565;
[2016] 1 C.M.L.R. 26. ^ ..___". . . . ..
"The Belgian Court of Appeal asked whether there is a breach ofart.267 TFEU, partly in the light of the second
paragraph ofart.47 and 52(3) of the Charter, when the highest coun rejects a request for a preliminaiy mling, with
the only reason given being that "since the grounds of appeal were not admissible for a reason specific to the proceedings
before the Hof. Aquino v Belgische Staat (C-3/16) 4 January 2016.
45 See fn. 10.
46 AC Wahl referred to the possibility for individuals to lodge a case with the ECtHR as being part_ot he system
of checks and balances under art.267 TFEU. Opinion mXv Inspecteurvan Rijksbelastingdienst (C-71/14)
EU:C:2015:564; [2016] 1 C.M.L.R. 27 at[63].
47 M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press,-2014), p"239; LacchC'The ECrtHR's Interference" (2015) S Review of European Administrative Law 95.
48C/Z-^/r(283/81)EU:C:1982:335; [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472 at [9].
WCartesio\C-2l6/06) EU:C:2008:723; [2009] 1 C.M.L.R. 50 at [90]; Consiglio nazionale dei geologi (C-\W\'1~)
EU:C:2013:489; [2013] 5 C.M.L.R. 40 at [28]. See also M. Broberg, "Preliminary References as a R^ght-^butjor
Whom? The Extent o which Preliminary Reference Decisions can be Subject o Appeal" (2011) 36 E.L. Rev. 276.
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cooperation between the ECJ and national courts as the two main objectives of the preliminary mling
procedure.50 National courts, even those against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy, are not obliged
to automatically refer a matter to the ECJ if a party contends that there is a question concerning the
interpretation r validity of EU law. Individuals cannot exert any influence on whether questions are
posed to the ECJ or how the questions are actually formulated.52 National courts thus enjoy the "widest
discretion" and have a 'monopoly' to determine the need for a preliminary ruling and the relevance of the
questions. In this light it is not surprising that earlier attempts to amend the Treaties in order to enable
the ECJ to act as a fourth-instance appeal in case of refusals to refer or non-implementation fthe
preliminary rulings of the ECJ have remained unsuccessful.54
At first sight, the case law of the ECtHR seems to run counter to this constmction of the preliminary
reference procedure specially because it places so much emphasis on the request of the parties.55
Nonetheless, the ECJ has not completely ignored the effective judicial protection dimensions of the
preliminary reference procedure.56 The ECJ established, on the basis of the principle of sincere co-operation,
laid down in art. 4(3) TEU, that "it is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and
procedures which ensure respect for the right o effective judicial protection".57 This was later codified in
the Lisbon Treaty in art. 19(1) TEU. In later cases, the EC J determined even more specifically that "it is
the responsibility of the national courts in particular to provide the legal protection which individuals
derive from the mles of Community law and to ensure that hose mles are fully effective".58 The EC J also
confirmed in Opinion 1/09 (European Patent Court) that within the context of the preliminary reference
procedure, national courts are involved "in the protection of individual rights conferred by that legal
order".9 In addition, the ECJ determined that art.267 TFEU creates a "complete and coherent system of
judicial protection" together with the direct actions to challenge the legality ofEU acts under arts 263 and
277 TFEU. It also explicitly championed art.267 as an equally effective indirect "initial judicial remedy"
5SCartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato b(C-210/06) EU:C:2008:723; [2009] 1 C.M.L.R. 50 at [91]; Schwarze v Einfuhr-
und Vorratsstellefur Getreide und Futtermittel (16/65) EU:C: 1965:117; [1966] C.M.L.R. 1 72; Foto-Frost (314/85)
EU:C: 1987:452 at [15]. See also CJEU, "Recommendations tonational courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation
of preliminary ruling proceedings" [2012] OJ C338/01 at [1] and [5].
"Foto-Frost (314/85) EU:C:1987:452 at [14].
"Hessische Knappschaft v Singer et Fils (44/65) EU:C:1965:122; [1966] C.M.L.R. 82.
"Elchinov  Natsionalna Zdravnoosiguritelna K sa (C-173/09) EU:C:2010:581; [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. 29 at [25];
KrizanvSlovenska inspekcia zivotneho pmstredia (C-416/10) EU:C:2013:8; [2013] Env. L.R. 28 at [64];XvInspecteur
vanRijksbe!astingdienst(C-72/l4-) EU:C:2015:564; [2016] 1 C.M.L.R. 27 at [58].
' The European Parliament accepted, on the instigation of Spinelli, a Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union
which would replace the EEC and Euratom Treaties. Article 43 refers to the "creation of a right of appeal to the Court
against he decisions of national courts of last instance where reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling is refused
or where a preliminary uling of the Court has been disregarded": [1984] OJ C77/33.
Some authors even claim that his comes close to a recognition by the ECtHR that a reference for a preliminary
ruling constitutes an autonomous ubjective right of the parties in national court proceedings. Lacchi, "The ECrtHR s
interference" (2015) 8 Review of European Administrative Law 95,111; Opinion of AG Bot in Willy Kempter KG v
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (C-2/06) EU:C:2008:78; [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 21 at [97].
56 See fhn. 1-2.
57 Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council (C-50/00 P) EU:C:2002:462; [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 at [41]-[42];
Commission vJego-Quere (C-263/02 P) EU:C:2004:210; [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 12 at [31]-[32]. M. Broberg, "Judicial
Coherence and the Preliminary Reference Procedure" (2015) 8 Review of European Administrative Law 9, 33.
5SPfeiffer v Deutsches Roles Kreuz Kreisverband Waldshut eF(C-397/01) EU:C:2004:584; [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 44
at [111] (emphasis added); Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food (C-16W06) EU:C:2008:223; [2008] 2 C.M.L.R.
47 at [42].
59 Opinion 1/09 [2011 ] 3 C.M.L.R. 4 at [84]. See also Kobler v Austria (C-224/01) EU:C:2003:5 13; [2003] 3
C.M.L.R. 28 at [35].
fa Union de PequenosAgricultoresv Council (C-50/OOP)EV:C:2002-A62; [ 002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 at[40];Jego-Quere
(C-263/02 P) EU:C:2004:210; [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 12 at [30].
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which could fill the gaps that stem from the difficulties in gaining direct access to the ECJ on the basis of
art.263 TFEU.61 It thus appears afe to say, on the basis of the ECJ's own case law, that he preliminary
reference procedure has become the most important remedy for private parties to ensure judicial coherence
in the EU. For this reason, it has been referred to as the "citizens infringement procedure".62 From the
perspective of ED law proper, the preliminary reference procedure is both a potential vehicle for the
protection of fundamental rights and especially of the right o effective judicial protection as well as a
mechanism for ensuring the "collective good" of judicial cooperation between the ECJ and national courts.
The way in which the ECtHR constmes the preliminary eference procedure as a mechanism safeguarding
the individual right o a fair trial and thus it is not that odd and unfamiliar a figure in EU law. Another
reason why the problematic nature of the case law of the ECtHR should be downplayed is that national
(constitutional or supreme) courts have also scrutinised the reference practice of lower courts under an
individual (constihitional) rights-based approach. In Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and Slovakia,
constitutional courts examine the highest court's failures to refer from the point of view of the right o a
lawful judge.63 By contrast, he Spanish and Slovenian constitutional courts approach the matter from the
perspective of the right o a fair trial and procedural guarantees linked to the right of defence of the parties.
Even though the judgments of the ECtHR do not "interfere" with EU law, the case law of the ECtHR
still give rise to several difficulties. The first problem is that he case law of the ECtHR is not always very
consistent and it is not unthinkable that national courts are struggling with the rather vague criteria
developed by the ECtHR, which do not offer much definitive guidance yet.65 As a matter of fact, the case
law of the ECtHR has already led to a question of the Belgian Court of Appeal in Aquino. The absence
of clear guidance from the ECtHR creates the risk that national courts come up with different approaches
and individuals are treated ifferently in different Member States. This difference also stems from the fact
that also arises because individuals can bring cases concerning a failure by the highest courts to refer
before the constitutional court in some Member States, while not in others." This divergence is not only
undesirable from the point of view of fundamental rights protection, but it could also jeopardise the
uniformity of EU law, which is one of the main concerns of the ECJ and which it heavily stressed in
t'lT&L Sugars and Sidul Afucares v Commission (C-456/13 P) EU:C:2015:284 at [22] and [31]; Inuit Tapiriit
Kanatami (C-583/11 P) EU:C:2013:625 ; [2014] 1 C.M.L.R. 54 at [93]; Telefonica v Commission (C-274/12 P)
EU:C:2013:852 at [29]. A. Albors-Llorens, "Remedies against he EU Institutions after Lisbon: an Era of Opportunity?"
(2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 507, 534; C. Lacchi, "Multilevel Judicial Protection in the EU and Preliminary
References" (2016) 53 C.M.L. Rev. 679, 687-688.
"P. Pescatore, "Van Gend en Loos, 3 February 1963: A View from Within" in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai
(eds). The Past and the Future ofEU law: The Classics ofEU law revisited on the 50th anniversary of the Rome
Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), p.7.
63 This approach is based on the idea that he highest national courts have no jurisdiction on the basis of art.267(3)
TFEU to rule in cases in which there is a question about the interpretation or validity ofEU law. In such cases it is
the CIEU that is the lawful judge. For an extensive discussion, see C. Lacchi, "Review by Constitutional Courts of
the Obligation of National CouUs of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU"
(2015) 16 German Law Journal 1663, 1668.
"Out of these courts, the Czech and the Slovenian constitutional courts examine the higher court's statement of
reasons for the refusal to refer. Lacchi, "Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last
InstancetoReferaPreliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU" (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1663,
1678 and 1682.
65 This can also be attributed to the fact that the judgments of the ECtHR are rather casuistic and focused on the
national context and factual circumstances. Opinion ofAG Trstenjak in R. (on the application ofNS) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department (C-411/10) EU:C:2011:865; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 9 at [145] and [146]. M. de Werd,
"Dynamics at Play in the EU Preliminary Ruling Procedure" (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law 149, 151.
"'Seefh.44.
"Lacchi, "Multilevel Judicial Protection" (2016) 53 C.M.L. Rev. 679, 697.
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Opinion 2/13. A judgment of the ECJ has a far stronger (hannonising) legal effect han the judgments
of the ECtHR.69 The EC J should thus express itself on the matter in order to give definitive guidance to
national (constitutional or supreme) courts. The ECJ's clarification could also inspire or help the ECtHR
in the way in which it deals with art.267 TFEU cases and contribute to a more solid and consistent approach.
A second problem is that it is not always clear whether the judges of the ECtHR have sufficient in-depth
knowledge of the actual functioning of the procedure and of the relevant details ofEU law.70 In Chylinski,
the ECtHR, for example, came up with a seemingly new reason for national courts not to refer beyond
the C/Z/-7r grounds. It held that:
"In any event, it is inconceivable that the ECJ could have given a preliminary ruling in time; this
means that a preliminary mling could have provided no guidance to the Court of Appeal in deciding
on the lawfulness of the applicants' continued etention."
This line of reasoning begs the question as to whether the ECtHR is sufficiently aware of the urgent
preliminary ruling procedure for persons in custody which usually does not take more than two months.72
Furthermore, it is not completely clear how this ground relates to the case law of the EC J and the C1LF1T
exceptions."
A third problem is the rather procedural or formalistic approach of the ECtHR and the focus on the
requests of the parties.74 On the basis of the analysis of the case law of the ECtHR, it seems that-at least
at this moment-it s not problematic for the ECtHR that national courts refrain from referring if there
was no request, even though, from the perspective of EU law, they should have referred on the basis of
art.267 TFEU." The ECtHR seems to favour asimple reference to the applicant's request for a preliminary
ruling and/or CILFIT over a substantive engagement with EU law, also because the ECtHR does not
consider itself in the position to examine the correctness of the national court's engagement with EU law
and CILFIT.76 By contrast, what matters most for the ECJ is whether a national court has complied with
its obligation to refer, irrespective of a request by one of the parties. The EC J also requires national courts
to conduct an in-depth analysis of the CILFIT conditions for acte clair.77 It is not unthinkable that national
 
Foto-Frost(3l4/&5) EU:C:1987:452 at [15]; Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454 at [174] and [176].
'''While judgments of the CJEU are binding on all national courts, ECtHR judgments are declaratory in nature and
do not formally bind all States Parties to the ECHR, since art.46(l) ECHR stipulates that judgments are binding inter
paries.
J. Krommendijk, "The Use of the ECtHR Case Law by the CJEU after Lisbon: the View of the Luxembourg
Insiders" (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 812, 831.
71 Chylinski (38044/12) at [48].
"Article 267, last sentence, TFEU.
The ECtHR cited, without any explanation, several judgments in which the CJEU held that it has no jurisdiction
"when at the time it is made the procedure before the court making it has already been terminated". See e.g. SPUC v
Grogan (C-159/90) EU:C:1991:378; [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 at [12]. Chyiinski (38044/12) at [34].
74Seefnn.35-37.
Lacchi, "Review by Constitutional Courts" (2015) 16 German Law Journal 1663, 1690 and 1696. One recent
example is Avotins where the ECtHR also touched upon this issue, albeit in a different context, when examining
whether the Bosphorus presumption of equivalent protection applied. The ECtHR concluded that the absence of a
reference by the Latvian Supreme Court was "not adecisive factor" and held that he Bosphorus presumption applied.
The main reason for this was that the applicant itself had refrained from requesting the Latvian court to make a
preliminary reference to the CJEU. The ECtHR did not examine more substantively whether the Supreme Court had
an obligation to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling out of its own motion. Avotins v Latvia (17502/07) 23
May 2016 at [111]. L. Glas and J. Krommendijk, "From Opinion 2/13 to Avotins: Recent Developments in the
Relationship between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Court" Human Rights Law Review (forthcoming).
76 See fnn.28 and 38-39; Lacchi, "The ECrtHR's Interference" (2015) 8 Review of European Administrative Law
95, 104.
'"CILFIT(2S3/Sl)EV:C:l9S2:335;[l9S3]lCM.L.R. 472a.t[l6]-['20].Associatwn France Nature Environnement
(C-379/15)EU:C:2016:603 at [53]. Seefn.116.
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courts are tempted to focus more on the formal procedural demands of the ECtHR than on a correct
substantive application of CILFIT. This is because the remedies under EU law to address non-referring
courts are limited and it might be easier for individuals to enforce the former by lodging their case with
the ECtHR.78 As a result, it cannot be ruled out that he case law of the ECtHR (further) undermines the
application of the CILFIT criteria by national courts.79 Leaving aside whether these seeming inconsistencies
are real and whether national courts will indeed favour the approach of the ECtHR, the preceding analysis
shows that here are unanswered questions as to how the case law of the ECtHR and the ECJ relate to
each other, in addition to the points already noted earlier.80 This uncertainty can be particularly challenging
for national courts.
In summary, the difficulty with the case law of the ECtHR is not so much that he ECtHR changes the
nature of the preliminary reference procedure from a mechanism of inter-judicial co-operation to a
mechanism safeguarding the individual right o a fair trial. That is to say, both the ECJ and the constitutional
or supreme courts in some Member States have approached and scrutinised the procedure from the latter
perspective of fundamental rights as well. What is more problematic is the fact that the case law of the
ECtHR is not very consistent and, in the opinion of the present author, too formalistic. The ECJ should
thus step in as well and complement the case law of the ECtHR by providing additional guidance for
national courts.
The need for the ECJ to alleviate the absence of remedies for non-referring courts
Another eason for the ECJ to pronounce itself on the matter and conclude that national courts are also
obliged to provide reasons for their refusal to refer are the shortcomings in the preliminary reference
procedure from the point of view of the principle of effective judicial protection. While the three reasons
provided in the previous ection related to the deficient approach of the ECtHR, this reason stems from
the deficiencies in the EU judicial system itself.
Examining the preliminary reference procedure in the light of this general principle ofEU law, which
is also laid down in art.47 of the Charter, is warranted because, as was argued before, it was the ECJ itself
that has explicitly championed art.267 as an equally effective indirect remedy in the context of the "complete
and coherent system of judicial protection". In addition, the preliminary eference procedure has become
the most important remedy for private parties to ensure judicial coherence in the EU.83 Some authors have
even called for a further individualisation of the preliminary reference, also in the light of art.47 of the
Charter. Much has already been written about he deficiencies of the procedure, so there are only two
points which will be addressed in the remainder of this article.85
78Seefnn.94-96.
79 CILFIT has already been criticised because a literal reading would mean that he likelihood of establishing a
"tme" acte clair would "seem just as likely as encountering a unicorn". Opinion of AC Wahl in^(C-72/14)
EU:C:2015:319 at [62]. See fti.90.
80Seefnn.65-66.
^Aquino (C-3/16) 4 January 2016. AG Wattel, for example, advised, albeit unsuccessfully, the Dutch Supreme
Court to request a ruling from the CIEU whether art.267 TFEU and art.47 of the Charter precluded the Court from
providing no or only a short statement of reasons in the light of the case law of the ECtHR: Xv Financial Secretary
(Netherlands) ECLI:NL:PHR:2015:996.
82 See fim.59-61; the CIEU also interpreted art.267 TFEU in the light ofart.47 in relation to a Bulgarian rule
providing that a national court is to be disqualified because it gave a provisional opinion in its request for a preliminary
mling when outlining the factual and legal context. Criminal Proceedings against Ognyanov (C-614/15) EU:2016:514.
"Broberg, "Preliminary References as a Right" (2011) 36 E.L. Rev. 276.
84 M. Safjan and D. Diisterhaus, "A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a Multi-level Challenge
through the Lens ofArt.47 CFREU" (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 1, 38.
AG Wathelet recently held that "it can no longer be contended that a reference for a preliminary ruling is an
adequate mechanism to safeguard effective judicial protection". Opinion ofAG Wathelet in Stichting Woonlinie v
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A first problem relates to the actual application of the procedure. National courts often lack the necessary
knowledge of EU law or they are simply unwilling to refer. There is sufficient (anecdotal) evidence
suggesting that here are ample occasions during which the preliminary reference procedure should have
been used. It is an often-told story that many constitutional courts are reluctant to turn to the ECJ for help.86
National judges themselves are critical of their knowledge about EU law and experience difficulties with
applying EU law.87 Several studies have demonstrated that many judges are not familiar with the preliminary
reference procedure.88 Other factors also inhibit national judges from asking questions, such as their
workload or the necessity of meeting targets. It is therefore not surprising that national judges are eager
to use the CILFIT doctrines of acte clair and acte eclaire to avoid a burdensome referral.
A second problem related to the preliminary reference procedure from the point of view of effective
judicial protection is that here are hardly any effective remedies in case a national court is indeed unwilling
to refer.91 One option is Kobler liability, but this is largely a theoretical possibility. It was in KSbler that
the ECJ detennined that the principle of state liability also applies in case of infringements of EU law
which stem from a decision of a national court of last instance. The ECJ made clear that the Austrian
court was not entitled to withdraw its request for a preliminary mling because the CILFIT requirements
had not been fulfilled.93 This means that in case national courts refuse to request a preliminary mling,
despite an obligation to do so, there is an ex post possibility of obtaining damages. This form of liability,
Commission (C-133/12 P) EU:C:2014:105 at [32]. P. van Malleghem and N. Baeten, "Before the Law stands a
Gatekeeper-Or, what is a 'Regulatory Act' in Art. 263(4) TFEU? Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami" (2014) 51 C.M.L. Rev.
1214; B. Libgober, "Can the EU be a Constitutional System without Universal Access to Judicial Review" (2015) 36
Michigan Journal of International Lav/ 257; H. Schermers and D. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European
Union (Kluwer, 2001), p.910.
"It was only very recently that he Spanish, French, and-subsequently-German co stitutional courts asked a
preliminary ruling from the CJEU. See F v Premier ministre (C-168/13 PPU) EU:C:2013:358; [2014] 2 C.M.L.R.
19; Melloni v Mmisterio Fiscal (C-399/11) EU:C:2013:107; [2013] 2C.M.L.R. 43; Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag
(C-62/14)EU:C:2015:400; [2016] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.
87 J. Mayoral et al., "Creating EU Law Judges: the Role of Generational Differences, Legal Education and Judicial
Career Paths in National Judges' Assessment regarding EU Law Knowledge" (2014) 21 Journal of European Public
Policy 1120; M. Bobek, "Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice through the
Eyes of National Courts" in M. Adams et al. (cds.). Judging Europe 's Judges: The Legitimacy of the European Court
of Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), p. 197 atpp.212-213.
88 Bobek, "Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants" in Judging Europe 's Judges (2013), p. 197 at pp.212-213. European
Parliament, Report on the role of the national judge in the European judicial system, 2007/2027(FNI). See also T.
Nowak et al., "National judges as European Union Judges: Knowledge, Experiences and Attitudes of Lower Court
Judges in Germany and the Netherlands" (Eleven International, 2011).
89M. Wind, "The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance towards Supranational Judicial Review" (2010) 48 J. C.M.S.
1039; J. Golub, "The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between National Courts and the
European Court of Justice" (1996) 19 West European Politics 360. For a good study of such factors, see M. Broberg
and N. Fenger, "Variations in Member States' Preliminary References to the Court of Justice-Are Stmctural Factors
(Part of) the Explanation?" (2013) 19 E.L.J 488.
"G. Davies, "Activism Relocated: The Self-restraint of the European Court of Justice in its National Context"
(2012) \9 Journal of European Public Policy 76, 84; A. Amull, "The Use and Abuse of Art. 177 EEC" (1989)52
Modern Law Review, 631; N. Fenger and M. Broberg, "Finding Light in the Darkness: On the Actual Application of
the Acte Clair Doctrine" (2011) 30 Yearbook of European Law 180. For criticism as to the doctrine ofacte clair, see
Opinion ofAG Wahl in^(C-72/14) EU:C:2015:319 at [54].
91 In some Member States, there is a remedy under national aw, primarily in the form of a complaint o the
constitutional court. See fn.6-64.
"Kobler (C-224/01) EU:C:2003:513; [2003] 3 C.M.L.R. 28. This judgment was later confirmed in Traghetti del
Mediterraneo v Italy (C-173/03) EU:C:2006:391; [2006] 3 C.M.L.R. 19. The CIEU also determined that Italian
legislation limiting state liability for damage caused by courts of last instance breached EU law. Commission v Italy
(C-379/10)EU:C:2011:775.
93 Kobler (C-224/01) EU:C:2003:513 at [117]-[118].
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however, has hardly been applied by national courts in practice.94 The ECtHR has also commented on the
insufficiency of this "remedy".95 The limited practical effects are not surprising because it is a rather
delicate affair for a lower court to establish a breach of EU law by a superior court.96 Moreover, the
threshold is rather high and it seems difficult to fulfil the conditions for state liability because such liability
can only arise in "the exceptional case where the court has manifestly infnnged the applicable law", as
the ECJ stipulated in Kobler?7 The EC J eventually determined in Kobler that he incorrect reading of the
relevant ECJ judgment was not a sufficiently serious breach to give rise to liability. It was only recently
in Ferreira da Silva that he ECJ seemed to suggest hat he refusal of a Portuguese Supreme Court of
Justice to request apreliminary uling could constitute a breach ofart.267 TFEU which could potentially
give rise to state liability.'9 The ECJ, however, did not explicitly apply its criteria formulated in Kobler,
nor did it examine the fulfilment of the conditions for state liability.
Furthermore, the Commission has the possibility to enforce the obligation to request preliminary ulings
on the basis of the infringement proceedings in arts 258-260 TFEU. The Commission has, so far, not
made use of this, save for one exception.100 This possibility is generally not seen as an efficient way of
enforcing the obligation to request, nor is it directly beneficial for individuals in concrete cases.
This overview shows that here are considerable problems related to the preliminary eference procedure
from the point of view of effective judicial protection. This raises the question as to how obliging courts
to include a statement of reasons in their refusals to refer could address these problems. A statement of
reasons would make it more difficult for national courts, especially those of last instance, to refuse all too
"One exception is the acceptance of the Swedish Chancellor of Justice to pay compensation for the failure to refer
of the Swedish Admistrative Supreme Court in Flexlink. Broberg, "National Courts of Last Instance failing to Make
a Preliminary Reference" (2016) 22 European Public Law 243,250; L. Coutron (ed.), L 'obligation de renvoi prejudiciel
a la Cour de Justice: me obligation sanctionnee? (Bruylant, 2014); Bobek, "Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants" in
Judging Europe's Judges (2013), p.197 atp.216; J. Campbell, "Unenforceable Impracticality: Exploring Kobler's
Constitutional, Jurispmdential and Practical Miscues" (2010) 3 8 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce;
B. Beutler, "State Liability for Breaches of Community Law by National Courts: is the Requirement of a Manifest
Infringement of the Applicable Law an Insurmountable Obstacle?' (2009) 46 C.M.L. Rev. 773.
95 Chylinski (38044/12) at [47].
"Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary references to the European Court of Justice (2014), p.269.
"The CIEU hinted that his is the case when the "infringement was intentional". Kobler (C-21W\) EU:C:2003:513
at [53], [55], [123]-[124]. Ithas been argued by (then) AG Jacobs that Kobler liability will only arise in case of bad
faith. Jacobs as referred to in Broberg, "National courts of last instance failing to make a preliminary reference" (2016)
22 European Public Law 243, 250. In addition, a condition for state liability is that he rule ofEU law is intended to
confer ights on individuals and, as we have seen, art.267 TFEU does not bestow rights upon individuals This could
arguably'be different if the CJEU determines that art.47 Charter entails an obligation of courts to justify their efusal
to refer. It is also difficult o prove the causal ink between the damage the individual has suffered and the omission
to refer.
WK6bler (C-224/01) EU:C:2003:513 at [123]-[124].
"The CJEU held that "in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings", the Portuguese court
was obliged to refer. The Portuguese court was wrong in considering the answer to be clair because of the conflicting
decisions of lower courts regarding the interpretation of the concept of a "transfer of a business" and the fact that hat
concept frequently gives rise to difficulties of interpretation i  various Member States. Ferreira da Silva v Portugal
(C-160/14)EU:C:2015:565; [2016] 1 C.M.L.R. 26 at [44]-[45].
100 The Commission started proceedings against Sweden both because of the allegedly low number of preliminary
references and because of the absence of a statement of reasons for a refusal to refer. The Commission dropped the
case in 2006 when a legislative amendment was made which obliged Swedish courts of last instance to give reasons
for such a refusal. The Commission has also indirectly enforced the obligation to refer, by challenging the failure of
the Italian Government to amend a law despite different interpretations of several Italian courts which were in breach
ofEU law. Commission v Italy (C-129/00) EU:C:2003:656; [2006] 2 C.M.L.R. 1. M. Taborowski, "Infringement
Proceedings and Non-compliant National Courts" (2012) 49 C.M.L. Rev. 1906
"'Lenaerts et al., EU Procedural Law (2014), pp.102-103; Broberg, "National Courts of Last Instance failing to
Make a Preliminary Reference" (2016) 22 European Public Law 243, 251.
(2017) 42 E.L. Rev., Issue I © 2017 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
Obliging National Courts to Reason their Refusals to Refer 59
easily to send a preliminary reference if there is a well-substantiated request from one of the parties.'02 It
compels national judges to seriously consider EU law and the case law of the EC J as well as the fulfilment
of the CILFIT cnteria. This could consequently eiihance national courts' compliance with their obligations
under art.267 TFEU. 3 In addition, in order forKobler liability to be more effectively utilised by individuals
it is also important for them to know the reasons why a court considered a reference unnecessary.104 Besides
preventing arbitrariness, a statement of reasons could also improve the quality of judgments and in that
way possibly also improve perceptions of procedural legitimacy of the judgment.105 Which is not to say
that he requirement of a reasoned refusal is an effective remedy that would make Kobler redundant-but
it could be one small, albeit indispensable, step in the direction of improving individuals' indirect access
to the ECJ and, hence, of safeguarding effective judicial protection.106
A solid basis in EU law for requiring national courts to give reasons for refusals to refer
The previous section has shown that the ECJ should step in to provide the necessary clarification as to
the obligation for courts to provide reasons for refusal to refer. This raises the question as to whether and
how the ECJ could do this, i.e. whether there is a solid legal basis in EU law for this. This section argues
that here are sufficient starting points in the Treaties, the Charter and the case law of the ECJ to conclude
that national courts are required to offer easons for their efusal to refer a preliminary mling to the ECJ.
This might also explain why AG Bot argued, without any explanation, that CILFIT actually places on the
highest courts "an enhanced uty to state reasons where they refrain from referring questions".Io? What is
more, the ECJ's First Chamber also seemed to make an implicit reference to this obligation to provide
reasons in Association France Nature Environnement, albeit without much elaboration and without any
reference to a source of law. After eferring to CILFIT, it held that when the highest court is convinced
that there is no reasonable doubt as to the interpretation ofEU law "it must establish in detail" that there
is no such doubt. It is not unthinkable that his conclusion reflects the case law of the ECtHR or at least
an analysis of the ECJ's jurispmdence in relation to the Charter, which will now be discussed in turn.
The ECJ is already held on the basis ofEU law to take due notice of the ECHR and the jurispmdence
of the ECtHR, even though the EU has not yet acceded to the ECHR and is not formally bound by the
Whether this also leads to more references i  unclear. The Swedish legislative amendment of 2006 did not lead
to a (significantly) higher number of cases referred to the CJEU. From 1995 to 2006, there were 63 cases referred to
the CJEU by Swedish courts (5.25 cases per year), from 2007 to 2014, there were 47 cases (5.88 cases). Court of
Justice of the European Union, Annual report 2014, p. 116. See also U. Bemitz, "Preliminary ulings by the EU Coun
of Justice. The attitude and practice of the Swedish courts" (2010), Sieps, http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/flles/622
-2010_2_summary.pdf [Accessed 17 December 2016].
I03Lacchi, "The ECrtHR's Interference" (2015) S Review of European Administrative Law 95, 98; Broberg, "National
Courts of Last Instance failing to Make a Preliminary Reference" (2016) 22 European Public Lew 243, 256.
104 See fn. 15. It is also easier for the national court handling a Kobler claim to examine whether the court had indeed
fulfilled the criteria for liability. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that when national courts provide reasons
for their efusals to refer, they can more easily avoid liability, because of the absence of bad faith on their part. See
fti.97.
Bobek, "Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants" m Judging Europe's Judges (2013), p.203.
Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary References (2014), p.270; Lacchi, "Multilevel Judicial Protection" (2016) 53
C. M.L. Rev. 679, 703-704.
"'Opinion in Ferreira da Silva (C-160/14) EU:C:2015:565 at [90] and [94]. AG Bot also referred to Dhahbi with
approval. Opinion in Ognyanov (C-614/14) EU:C:2016:111 at [38] and [101]. In addition, also the EFTA Court has
held that here might be a breach ofart.6(l) ECHR if the decision to refuse to refer is not reasoned without much
discussion and only with reference to Ullens de Schooten. The EFTA Court even determined this in relation to a lower
court which was not obliged to refer. Irish Bank Resolution Corp Z^(E-18/11) [2013] 1 C.M.L.R. 9 at [64].
IU8Note that AG Kokott did not discuss this issue at all in her Opinion. See Association France Nature Environnement
(C-379/15) EU:C:2016:603 at [53].
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ECHR. 109 Nevertheless, art.6(3) TEU underlines that the provisions of the ECHR are general principles
ofEU law.110 In addition, art.52(3) of the Charter stipulates that the meaning and scope of Charter rights
which correspond to the rights in the ECHR, will be the same as those in the ECHR. The Explanations to
art.52(3), which are not legally binding, further add that,
"the meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those
instmments, but also by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights".
The ECJ, for example, held in DEB and McB that art. 52(3) extends the obligation of conform interpretation
to the case law of the ECtHR.112 In these and other cases, the EC J has indeed relied on the case law of the
ECtHR extensively, also in relation to art.6 ECHR. "3
Even if the ECJ chooses to downplay the relevance of the case law of the ECtHR and examine the
matter "solely" on the basis of the Charter, there are sufficient starting points for requiring national courts
to give reasons for refusals to refer in the EC J's own case law. The EC J has already dealt with the
obligation for national courts to state reasons in relation to art.47 of the Charter in Trade Agency and
FlyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines. These cases dealt with the recognition of judgments emanating from other
Member States in civil and commercial matters. The EC J held in relation to art.47 of the Charter that "the
observance of the right o a fair trial requires that all judgments be reasoned in order to enable the defendant
to understand why judgment has been pronounced against him and to bring an appropriate and effective
appeal against such a judgment". The ECJ indirectly referred to the ECtHR by quoting a point in the
Opinion of AG K-okott which explicitly discussed the case law of the ECtHR. "6 Trade Agency and
FlyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines show that there are already some starting points in the case law of the ECJ
itself which could enable the ECJ to require national courts to provide a statement of reasons if they decline
to refer a matter to the ECJ.
109 The CJEU determined that he ECHR "does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it,
a legal instrument which as been formally incorporated into European Union law". Akerberg v Fransson (C-617/10)
EU:C:2013:105; [2013] 2 C.M.L.R. 46 at [44]; Opmon 2/7J EU:C:2014:2454 at [185].
""The CJEU held that "art. 6(3) TEU confirms [that] fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general
principles". Kone Oyj v Commission (C-510/11 P) EU:C:2013:696; [2014] 4 C.M.L.R. 10 at [21]. Following art.6(3)
TEU, the above-mentioned practice of constitutional or supreme courts scrutinising the reference practice of the
highest courts from a fundamental rights perspective could possibly constitute a "constitutional tradition common to
the Member States" and subsequently a general principle ofEU law as well. This is debatable because the majority
of Member States lack this practice. Nonetheless, a majority is not necessarily required on the basis ofart.52(4) of
the Charter, and the Explanations relating to it. AG Kokott mAkzo Nobel (C-550/07 P) EU:C:2010:229 at [94]-[95].
The Explanations hould only "be given due regard" on the basis ofart.52(7) Charter and 6(1) TEU.
m DEB v Germany (C-279/09) EU:C:2010:811 ; [2011] 2 C.M.L.R. 21 at [35]. See, recently. Tall v CPAS de Huy
(C-239/14) EU:C:2015:824 at [54].
m DEB (C-279/09) EU:C:2010:811 at [35]; DGRFP v Toma (C-205/15) EU:C:2016:499. For a discussion of the
way in which the CJEU deals with the case law of the ECtHR, see Krommendijk, "The Use of the ECtHR Case Law"
(2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 812.
The CIEU held several times that "Article 47 of the Charter secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article
6(1) of the ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47". Chalkor v Commission (C-386/10 P)
EU:C:2011:815; [2012] 4 C.M.L.R. 9 at [51]. The CJEU even held that the review of the validity ofEU secondary
law "must be undertaken solely in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter". N v Staatssecretaris
voorVeiligheidenJustitie(C-60l/l5PPU)EV:C:20\6-M;[20\6] 1 W.L.R. 3027 at [46]. See also in relation to
art.47, Ordredes barreauxfrancophones t germanophone v Conseildes ministres (C-543/14) EU:C:2016:605; [2016]
4W.L.R. 155 at [23].
n5flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines (C-302/13) EU:C:2014:2319 at [51]. See dwASML Netherlands BV (C-ISVOS)
EU:C:2006:787 at [28]; Trade Agency (C-619/10) EU:C:2012:531 at [53]. See more generally and earlier UNECTEF
vHeylens (222/86) EU:C: 1987:442; [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 901 at [15].
n" Trade Agency (C-619/W) EU:C:2012:531 at [60]; Opinion in Trade Agency (C-619/10) EU:C:2012:247 at [83].
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Further support for such a requirement can be derived from art.41(2)(c) of the Charter, which contains
a more specific expression of the rights of the defence and provides for the obligation of the administration
to give reasons for its decisions. Even though this article as such only contains an obligation for EU
institutions and cannot be relied upon directly in relation to Member States' authorities such as national
courts, the ECJ has determined that his provision is of "general application". The ECJ held that the
right o be heard is inherent in the fundamental principle ofEU law observing the rights of the defence.
As the ECJ stated in M:
"That right also requires the authorities to pay due attention to the observations thus submitted by
the person concerned, examining carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual
case and giving a detailed statement of reasons for their decision; the obligation to state reasons for
a decision which are sufficiently specific and concrete to allow the person to understand why his
application is being rejected is thus a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the
defence.""'
To sum up, requiring national coiirts to provide such a reasoned refusal is not a big step for the ECJ. The
ECJ could base itself upon the case law of the ECtHR with respect o art.6 ECHR. Another, more logical,
option would be that it relies on arts 41(2)(c) and 47 of the Charter. Placing such demands on national
courts is not unreasonable ither in the light of the obligation for Member States under art. 19(1) TEU to
provide remedies ufficient to ensure effective legal protection.
Conclusion
This article examined whether the fears about an "intmsive" ECtHR, following the Dhahbi and Schipani
judgments, are justified. Those concerns should be tempered. This especially holds tme for the concern
that the case law of the ECtHR seems to change the nature of the preliminary reference procedure from
a mechanism ofinter-judicial cooperation to a mechanism safeguarding the individual right o a fair trial.
This is because both the ECJ and constitutional or supreme courts in some Member States have approached
and scmtinised the procedure from the perspective of fundamental rights as well. However, the approach
of the ECtHR leads to several difficulties. The case law of the ECtHR has not fully crystallised yet and
seems to lack consistency, as a result of which there is a risk of divergence among national courts in the
way in which they act upon the case law of the ECtHR. In addition, the ECtHR puts more weight on a
mere reference to CILFIT than a(n implicit) substantive ngagement with EU law and CILFIT, whereas
it also links the obligation to provide reasons to a request of the parties. It is thus desirable that the ECJ
provides definitive guidance as to the obligations of national courts in relation to the keystone procedure
of the "complete" EU judicial system.
It would seem logical for the ECJ to conclude that national courts are also obliged to provide reasons
for their efusal to refer on the basis ofEU law itself. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, more specifically
arts 41(2)(c), 47 and 52(3), as well as art.l9(l) TEU and the existing case law of the ECJ constitute
sufficient building blocks for the ECJ to develop such a requirement. Several deficiencies in the preliminary
reference procedure from the point of view of effective judicial protection would also require the ECJ to
explicate that national courts are obliged to give reasons for their efusal to refer. All the more so because
WYSv Minister voorlmmigratie, /n;egrarieen^fe/(C-141/12)EU:C:2014:2081; [2015] 1 C.M.L.R. 18 at
[68]-[69]; CicalavRegioneSiciliana (C-482/10) EU:C:2011:868 at [28]; M(C-277/11) EU:C:2012:744 at [84].
II8M(C-277/11) EU:C:2012:744 at [81]-[82]; Soprope v Fazenda Publica (C-349/07) EU:C:2008:746; [2009] 2
C.M.L.R. 5 at [36].
11!>M(C-277/11) EU:C:2012:744 at [88]; Mukwabega v Prefet de police (C-166/13) EU:C:2014:2336; [2015] 1
C.M.L.R. 41 at [48].
""See above nn 57-58.
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the Köbler remedy of state liability is impractical and hardly used in practice. Another reason for the ECJ 
to take up this matter is that national courts can easily "abuse" the CJLFIT excepti�ns to refer-and
frequently do so. lfthe ECJ is to oblige national courts to enumerate the reasons for their refusal to refer, 
this could enhance national courts' compliance with their obligations under art.267 TFEU. Even though 
such an obligation would not solve all problems, it could be one small step in the direction of improving 
effective judicia! protection. 
(2017) 42 E.L. Rev., Issue 1 © 2017 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors (2017) 42 E.L. Rev., Issue 1 © 2017 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors 63 
